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Abstract 
The Chinese firms are producing a major part of the world’s manufactured goods and China 
is currently the third largest exporting nation in the world.  At the same time Chinese firms 
are only responsible for a minute number of well-known global brands.  It is this 
disproportionate representation that has been coined as China’s branding disadvantage.   
Using a broad range of theories and research, this project aims to give a comprehensive 
overview of this branding disadvantage.  Firstly, arguments will be presented as to why the 
lack of Chinese brands is actually a disadvantage.  Secondly, the causes of this disadvantage, 
as well as current obstacles to future global brand development in China, are discussed.  
Thirdly, the two main strategies available to Chinese firms wanting to overcome the 
disadvantage are evaluated.  Finally, a new third alternative strategy is described and 
recommended as more suitable than the other two.   
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1. Introduction 
As the global economy develops and business markets evolve, competition amongst global 
corporations grows ever fiercer.  Advantages that firms once had by adopting a specific 
manufacturing approach or technology, are now being imitated by competitors and what was 
once a competitive advantage quickly becomes industry standard.  As a result of this fierce 
imitation of best practices, companies are looking to differentiate themselves using assets 
that are not easily imitated by their competitors.  The asset that firms are increasingly 
turning to in their search for a “sustainable” competitive advantage is their brand.  Global 
corporations are investing huge amounts of money on advertising their brand and the value 
assigned to their brands is immense.  For example, Interbrand’s 2005 list of top global 
brands estimated the value of the Coca Cola brand at $67.5 billion and that of Microsoft at 
$59.9 billion. (http://www.businessweek.com) 
 
Brands can act as a competitive advantage in that every time a consumer sees a certain brand 
it evokes certain associations.  Keller (2003; pg 68) defines brand associations as 
informational nodes linked to the brand node in memory that contains the meaning of the 
brand for consumers.  Therefore if the associations evoked by a brand are positive then the 
brand acts as a competitive advantage.  For example, if a consumer sees a BMW logo on a 
product he might instantly associate that product with superior quality and leading 
technology.  These positive associations are what might convince the consumer to choose 
the higher-priced BMW product over other alternatives, which might be technically just as 
good. 
 
Detailing the intricate processes that firms go through to build a strong brand (customer-
based brand equity) lies outside the scope of this paper.  Nonetheless it is important to note 
that establishing a strong brand, which entails creating brand awareness and developing a 
favourable brand image in the mind of the consumer, is a complex task.  Building a strong 
brand (i.e. increasing brand equity) requires a thorough understanding of ones customer 
segment, repeated exposure to this segment, and message consistency in order not to confuse 
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and thus anger consumers.  Many of the brand associations are rooted in the subconscious 
and each encounter with the brand can introduce new positive associations, strengthen 
existing ones, or even create negative detrimental associations.  As a result of the 
complexities involved with establishing a strong brand, imitation by competitors is almost 
impossible and in extreme cases illegal, therefore brand names are often seen as one of the 
firm’s main “sustainable” competitive advantages.  
 
Since brand names are seen as a vital source of competitive advantage for multinational 
corporations, we would expect nations with large consumer markets and a high volume of 
exports to be responsible for a variety of well-known global brands.  This is not far from the 
truth.  If you think of the world’s biggest exporter, Germany (Child and Rodrigues; 2005, pg 
381), one can instantly draw-up a long list of well-known global brands: Siemens, 
Mercedes-Benz, Adidas, BMW, SAP, etc.  Similarly for the world’s second biggest exporter, 
USA (Child and Rodrigues; 2005, pg 381), we can also draw on a long list of global brands: 
McDonalds, Nike, Coca Cola, Disney, Marlboro, Microsoft, etc.   
 
However, as the world’s third largest exporter (Child and Rodrigues; 2005, pg 381), China 
has few well-known global brands to boast about.  In the previously mentioned Interbrand 
ranking of Top 100 Brands in 2005, there was not one single Chinese brand present, whereas 
there were 9 German brands and even more American ones.  Furthermore, one of the first 
steps to building positive brand associations is establishing brand awareness.  If you were to 
asked an average western consumer to name a few global Chinese brands they would most 
likely struggle considerably to name more than one.  Have you ever heard of Lenovo, TLC, 
or Guangdong Galanz?  Probably not, but each of these brands are dominant players in their 
respective markets.  Lenovo is the worlds third-largest computer maker after Dell and 
Hewlett-Packard (Barboza; 2005), TLC is the worlds biggest television set maker (Barboza; 
2005), and Guangdong Galanz produces one out every three microwave ovens in the world 
and has captured a 40% share of the European market (Zeng and Williamson; 2003).  These 
are large corporations yet the majority of consumers outside of China have never heard of 
them. 
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China’s1 branding disadvantage is an issue that is of increasing importance and will be the 
broad focus of this paper.  The aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of the topic and 
thus answer a few crucial questions: Does the lack of strong global brands pose a problem 
for Chinese firms?  Why has China been so slow to develop such global brands?  What 
strategies can Chinese firms adopt in an attempt overcome this disadvantage?  The majority 
of China’s exports are durable consumer goods (www.intracen.org) such as electronics, toys 
and apparel, therefore firms within such industries will be the focus of this paper.  
Furthermore, focus is placed upon Chinese firms entering western markets (eg. USA & EU) 
because these are the world’s largest and most developed consumer markets and therefore 
contain many valuable lessons for Chinese brands.  This project will be dealt up into four 
main sections:   
 
In the first part of this paper attempts will be made to outline the importance of China 
developing global brands and the problems it might face in the future if it does not develop 
globally competitive brands.  One could argue that China has not developed global brands in 
the past yet it has been Asia’s fastest growing economy over the last 20 years 
(http://web.worldbank.org), so where is the need?  A major reason why the Chinese 
economy is growing at such an astounding rate is because of its competitiveness as a 
manufacturing destination, which is due to an abundance of low-cost labour and continual 
market liberalization.  However, is this competitive advantage sustainable in the long-run?  
If not, the Chinese economy will have to make use of competitive advantages besides low-
cost labour, in order to maintain the level of growth they are accustomed to.   
 
Furthermore, as the most populous country in the world with 1.3 billion (www.cia.gov) 
potential consumers, one might argue that the Chinese market is big enough to sustain large 
domestic corporations and that they need not rush to establish a presence in foreign markets.  
However, the joining of the W.T.O. in 2001 further guaranteed that China will continue to 
                                                 
1 Mainland China, excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan 
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open its doors to foreign firms.  These global brands are no longer in China just to 
manufacture goods for export, but are actually competing against local brands for domestic 
consumers.  Figures show that although local brands are still the most popular, foreign 
brands are posing a real threat.  As the average income of Chinese consumers continues to 
rise it will attract even more foreign firms, which will result in intensification of competition 
in local markets. 
 
Lastly, the importance of China establishing global brands was further confirmed by the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce as a report they produced stated that “we need to cultivate a 
group of independent famous brands that have international influence”. (Barboza; 2005)  
Furthermore, incentives are in place to encourage local brands to establish an international 
presence.  
 
In the second part of this paper I will investigate why China has not developed global brands 
in the past and what obstacles it faces in establishing such brands in the future.  As far as 
why China has not yet produced any true global brands, the reason lies mostly with the past 
political orientation of the country.  In a planned economy system there is no importance 
given to markets or international expansion and hence different competitive strategies are 
not explored.  Four phases of governance are outlined, which demonstrate how private 
enterprise was eradicated and free thought forbidden.     
 
Even though the government has now realized the need for local firms to establish brands 
there are a variety of obstacles that lie in their way.  The liberalization of the economy is on 
its way but still has some way to go.  The government still has majority stakes in a number 
of large domestic corporations and there are controls in place to restrict the ability of private 
firms to sell equity shares in the capital market and thereby raise capital. (Zeng and 
Williamson; 2003)  Moreover, subsidies and preferential procurement contracts have been 
offered to firms that align themselves with government goals. (Child and Rodrigues; 2005, 
pg 388)  Conventional theory says that corporations can only become truly competitive in 
free-markets with little-to-no government intervention, and only when firms are truly 
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competitive will they be willing to spend substantial resources on an intangible asset, like 
their brand, in hope of gaining a competitive advantage.  
 
The 23 provinces in China are historically very independent and there exists an element of 
rivalry between them.  A main reason for this high level of independence was that in case of 
attack on a specific province, the other provinces could sustain themselves and would not be 
dependent on the province under attack.  However, this issue of regional solidarity and 
provincial competition has had a substantial affect on Chinese enterprise.   
 
 The lack of experience in competitive strategies and brand building means that the Chinese 
firms must quickly learn what has taken their western counterparts decades. One part of this 
learning process entails getting to know your customer, which is vital for effective and 
successful brand building.  However, customer research has been almost non-existent in 
China.  In addition to infrastructure not accommodating traditional research methods, the 
Chinese culture is not very conducive to ordinary surveys.  Moreover, getting to grasps with 
the “typical” Chinese consumer is difficult due to the size of the population and the strong 
focus on provincial independence which we mentioned earlier. 
 
Western consumers represent the largest, most developed, and potentially most profitable 
target market for Chinese brands.  This creates an additional problem for Chinese brand 
managers because the western consumer is very different from the Chinese consumer.  
Whereas the western consumer has undergone a sort of homogenization process over the last 
decades, the Chinese consumer has not been subjected to the MTV and Coca-Cola culture 
that has moulded the consumers in the west.  This gives a western brand an automatic 
advantage in the majority of western markets, not just their home market.  As a result, even 
though the Chinese brand managers may eventually understand their Chinese customers, it 
gives them little insight into how their western customers may behave.   
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Another substantial barrier that Chinese firms will face when trying to establish positive 
associations with their brand is something called the “country of origin” effect.  This is when 
the nation where the firm originates from evokes strong association in the mind of the 
consumer.  For example, when something is made by a German firm it is seen as robust and 
technologically sound, similarly if something is made in Italy it might be viewed as 
fashionable.  The “country of origin” effect for China is mainly not positive, with the 
exception of perhaps herbal medicine and tea.  Hence, the “country of origin” effect is 
another obstacle in the way for Chinese firms that are attempting to build a global. 
 
The lack of enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights is another reason why building a 
brand in China maybe more troublesome than elsewhere.  Piracy is common and brand 
names are often stolen.  This considerably reduces the incentive for local firms to invest in 
branding since other businesses can reap the gains on their branding expenditure.  
Furthermore, if customers have a negative experience with a “stolen” brand, the negative 
associations that are established towards this brand directly affects the original brand 
producer. 
 
In the third part of this paper I will briefly discuss the two main differing routes that a 
Chinese company can take to establishing a global brand.  I will attempt to highlight the 
main possible benefits and challenges of each of these routes, as well as try to give examples 
of Chinese firms that have undertaken such strategies.  On the one end, Chinese firms may 
decide to go it alone and proceed to setup parts of their organization in some of their main 
western markets.  This route one can label an Organic expansion strategy.  Naturally, this 
option will avoid a majority of the management integration conflicts that are associated with 
acquiring a foreign competitor.  Nonetheless, organic expansion is a delicate procedure and 
establishing a brand this way will require a long time period. 
 
The other route that a Chinese manufacturer may take is buying a competitor that already 
has established a presence in the target market.  This route one can label an Acquisition 
strategy.  The benefits of this strategy are that one established a brand presence 
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simultaneously, since you can use the established brand to sell your products.  However, one 
would most likely target foreign brands that are well established and evoke positive 
associations in the mind of the consumer, therefore the brands that should be targeted will be 
costly to acquire. 
 
Having outlined two opposite routes a Chinese firm can take when trying to establish a 
global brand; I will in the fourth part of this paper suggest a possible third route.  The third 
route is establishing a branding alliance, which can be explained as “the short- or long-term 
association or combination of two or more individual brands, products, and/or other 
distinctive proprietary assets.  These brands or products can be represented physically or 
symbolically by the association of brand names, logos, or other proprietary assets of the 
brand.” (Simonin, et al; 1998, pg 30)  In accordance to the make-buy-ally matrix cited by 
Child & Faulkner (1998) one could argue that ally option (i.e. brand alliance) is the most 
appropriate course of action in comparison to the make (i.e. organic route) or buy (i.e. 
acquisition) options. 
 
It will be discussed how a branding alliance may increase the strength of a Chinese brand.  
Initially the branding alliance works as a signal to customers that the product in question is 
of substantial quality and reduces associated risk.  Furthermore, research has shown that 
branding alliances can result in spillover effects.  This means that customers will eventually 
develop positive associates to the Chinese brand and not just the product which was co-
branded.  Following this path we will look at what conditions are conducive to beneficial 
spillover effects.  Lastly, the possible costs and benefits of a brand alliance will be discussed 
and compared to the two previously mentioned global brand establishing routes.  As a sort of 
mid-ground between the two previous routes, a branding alliance may enable firms to gain 
the benefits expected from either route while at the same time limit their disadvantages. 
 
The conclusion will summarise the previous chapters, as well as the contributions that 
should be noted by Chinese firms.  Finally, a brief recommendation is offered to Chinese 
firms. 
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2. The need to establish Global Brands 
2.1 The global Value Chain 
A value chain can be described as “the set of activities that a company employs in order to 
design, produce, and deliver the value proposed to the customer.” (Lasserre; 2003, pg 52)  
The value chain is generally depicted as is seen below (http://www.trumpuniversity.com):  
 
 
As trade barriers have fallen and transportation infrastructure improved, firms have spread 
their value chains over many countries in order to exploit cost advantages.  What we are 
witnessing these days is a Global Value Chain (Gereffi and Memedovic; 2003) where the 
activities in the developed world tend be concentrated within the Marketing & Sales or 
Service segments of the value chain, whilst the activities in the less developed world are 
focused on the generally less profitable segments of the value chain such as Logistics and 
Operations, basically manufacturing.  This holds true for China as they are the world’s third 
largest exporter but have virtually no famous global brands that they market or sell.  
“China's Ministry of Commerce reported this month that even though China's exports are 
dominated by consumer products, few famous Chinese brands are involved in the export 
trade. Most goods are being shipped abroad with foreign brand labels.”(Barboza; 2005)  
Essentially they are “the world's factory floor” (www.bbcnews.com) for the global brands.   
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Economic growth and development over the past 20 years has been phenomenal for China 
and this has happened on the basis of increasing amounts of manufacturing, so why change 
the focus?  As the cheap labour-pool from the countryside in China starts to dry up, slowly 
wages will begin to rise and so will other input prices.  When the increase becomes 
unsustainable for foreign multinationals they will look to cheaper locations to manufacture 
their goods and without much hassle transfer production facilities there.  As a result China 
will then have problems maintaining its current growth levels.  We are already witnessing a 
rapid rise in average income (see Chapter 3) and there are signs that investors are looking to 
move their Chinese manufacturing plants to neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh and 
Vietnam in order to cut costs. (Tor Olav Mørseth; 13/08/2006) 
 
China could attempt to compete with Bangladesh and Vietnam to maintain the lion share of 
world production by reducing corporate taxes and minimizing manufacturing regulations, 
essentially cutting costs for producers.   Engaging in this type of strategy would place China 
in “The Race to the Bottom” (Chan; March-April 2003), where less developed countries 
compete against each other for foreign capital.  The result is a progressive dismantling of 
regulatory standards and an unsustainable competitive advantage since global corporations 
will simply move their production to the country which is least well off.  In other words, this 
is not a viable long-term option.   
 
Another, much more feasible, option China has is to try and sustain their current growth by 
shifting the focus onto the other segments of the value chain.  By taking ownership of the 
other activities in the value chain and thereby establishing their own brands, Chinese firms 
will eventually be able to exploit a more embedded competitive advantage that is easier to 
sustain.  After establishing global brands Chinese firms will themselves be in the driving-
seat and no longer have to take orders from foreign multinationals.  In addition, with the 
control over a strong brand, firms can justify a premium price and no longer compete on 
price alone, which is the case with unbranded products.  As Interbrand Chairman Rita 
Clifton stated “He who owns the brand owns the wealth.”  (Stones; 2003, pg 23)   
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2.2 The need for “Global” brands 
Given that China understands the need to focus on the other sections of the value chain and 
thus establish brands, why should they be concerned with building global brands and not just 
focusing on their domestic market?  After all, their domestic market is potentially the biggest 
in the world with 1.3 billion consumers.  One reason is that China is still a developing 
country and in 2004 the GNI per capita was only $1,500 versus USA’s $41,440 
(worldbank.org).  This implies that solely focusing on the amount of consumers in the 
market will give us a distorted picture of its profit potential since the average Chinese citizen 
has a very limited purchasing power.   
 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) state five main reasons why it is a necessity for firms to 
become global: 
1. The Growth Imperative 
Here the authors point to the constant need for firms to expand and grow if they are to satisfy 
the capital markets and attract the best employees.  The concern with pleasing capital 
markets is not as applicable to Chinese firms because their capital markets are still in the 
infancy stage and not many private firms raise money that way.  However, going global may 
be a good way of attracting the leaders of tomorrow to your company, which seems to be a 
challenge in China since the availability of highly educated and experienced personnel is 
limited. (Dayal-Gulati and Lee; 2005, pg 95) 
 
2. The Efficiency Imperative 
This is more or less the profitability of the market we discussed at the start of this section.  It 
claims that domestic corporations may not have adequate potential customers in order to 
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reach critical economies of scale.  Furthermore, now that the Chinese markets are opening 
up to competing global brands, due to the W.T.O. accession in 2001, they will feel an 
increased pressure to expand their operations abroad in order to exploit economies of scale 
similar to those that their competitors enjoy.   
 
3. The Knowledge Imperative 
When firms enter foreign markets there are always differences in products, distribution 
channels, and sales/marketing techniques that the company must adapt to.  Being subjected 
to these differences and adapting to them is often a valuable learning experience that can 
benefit the firm in all other markets.  The more developed and competitive the markets are 
the greater the learning experience, hence entering western consumer markets (eg. USA & 
EU) will provide the greatest learning opportunity.  Obviously not all they learn abroad is 
applicable in their home-market, but major gains can be made in many fields such as 
innovation, customer service, and not at least branding. 
 
4. Globalization of Customers 
With the onset of globalization companies are becoming increasingly global and doing 
business in a diversity of countries, also individuals are travelling more frequently.  When 
doing business with these growing customer segments, firms must have a presence in 
multiple countries in order to offer their clients consistency and security of supply.  As 
Chinese individuals become more affluent and Chinese firms try to sell to foreign 
companies, having a global presence will be of mounting importance.  Furthermore, 
globalization has led to the development of converging tastes and needs in regions of the 
world (Gooderham and Nordhaug; 2003, pg 149), making it easier to appeal to a broad 
segment of the world population.      
 
5. Globalization of Competitors 
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If your competitors are present in a variety of countries and you are not, “they can use multi-
market presence to cross-subsidize and wage a more intense attack in your home markets.” 
(Gupta and Govindarajan; 2000, pg 46)  Now that the Chinese market is opening up we see 
an influx of foreign firms, not just to manufacture in China, but also to try and use their 
global brand to capture a sizable segment of this growing market.  As the graphs below 
demonstrate, foreign brands are making headway (William J. McEwen; 2005, March 8): 
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The graphs above measure brand awareness, which is only one of the required steps towards 
becoming a dominant brand in the market.  However, the dramatic increase in foreign brand 
awareness demonstrates how seriously these multinationals are targeting the Chinese market.  
Over the past 10 years Phillips and Samsung have both doubled their brand awareness in the 
electronics and TV segment, currently boasting a 70% rating, while the local market leader 
Changhong lies only slightly above at 87%.  In the market for computers Hewlett-Packard 
has managed to increase their brand awareness 6-fold over the last 10 years and is now only 
18% behind the local market leader Lenovo.      
 
The reasons given by Gupta and Govindarajan for going global are all valid, but it is the 
knowledge imperative and the increasing attack from foreign firms which constitute the 
main reasons for Chinese firms to quickly go global.   
 
 
2.3 The prestige of being Global 
Recent research has suggested that brands with a global image are preferred over local 
competing brands, even if they are not superior in quality or value.  The study carried out by 
Steenkamp, Batra and Alden in 2003 investigated how being perceived as a global brand can 
add value, where global brands are defined as “brands that consumers can find under the 
same name in multiple countries with generally similar and coordinated marketing 
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strategies.” (Steenkamp, Batra and Alden; 2003, pg 53)  They tested consumers from Korea 
and the U.S.A. with global and local brands from different product categories such as 
food/beverages, personal care products, and consumer durables.  What they found was that 
perceived “globalness” is in fact positively related to brand prestige and perceived product 
quality.  So the more a brand is seen as global, the more consumers will associate it with 
quality and prestige. 
 
Interestingly, the local brand’s icon value was also positively related to prestige, but there 
was no significant relationship between local icon value and perceived quality.  Hence the 
overall effect of perceived brand globalness on purchase likelihood was greater than the 
overall effect of local icon value on purchase likelihood.  This implies that establishing a 
global brand, which consumers perceive as highly global, can act as a source for competitive 
advantage and increase the likelihood that consumers choose your product over one with a 
more local brand.  This opinion is echoed by Johansson and Ronkainen in their article “The 
esteem of global brands” when they state that “globality should be used as an important 
ingredient in building a sustainable competitive advantage.” (Johansson and Ronkainen; 
2005, pg 354)  
 
The affect of global branding on purchase likelihood will tend to vary according to which 
product group we are discussing, but all in all “globalising a brand is a sound strategy in 
many product categories”. (Johansson and Ronkainen 2005, pg 353)  An aspect one could 
dispute with this research is that it only takes into consideration two consumer cultures, 
Korea and U.S.A., and if applied to Chinese consumers results would not be as convincing.  
However, surveys demonstrate that Chinese consumers are growing less fond of domestic 
goods.  William McEwen, Xiaoguang Fang, et al (2006) claim that Chinese consumer 
preference for domestic goods has over the last five years decreased from 78% to 67%.  
Furthermore, their survey claimed that Chinese consumers are increasingly concerned about 
the quality of domestic durable goods and a total of 37% feel it is only fair, while a whole 
8% believe it to be poor.  This makes going global a highly effect strategy for local brands to 
try and overcome their unfavourable quality association, since they may be seen as more 
global than domestic. 
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In the future, being perceived as more of a global brand than a domestic one will be of 
greater benefit since the younger population of China is increasingly positive towards 
western goods and more sceptical towards domestic ones.  The below table, taken from 
William J. McEwen (2005), demonstrates this trend: 
 
 
   
It comes as no surprise that the younger segments of the population are markedly different 
from those over 60, what is interesting is the significant difference between those aged 18-24 
and those aged 25-29.  Even though there is only an age gap of approximately seven years 
between the two segments, we see a clear increase (44% → 51%) in the percentage of 
respondents who feel goods produced in China are either of poor or fair quality.  Similarly, 
there is a decrease (30% → 22%) in the percentage of people who feel goods produced in 
China are of very good or excellent quality.   
 
In addition, there is a larger percentage of the youngest segment (44%) that considers goods 
produced in the U.S.A. to be of very good or excellent quality than of the next youngest 
segment (32%).  Going global will not make a Chinese brand American, but one could argue 
that many American brands tend to be seen as more international since their operations are 
spread all over the globe, rather than simply American.  Therefore if Chinese brands join this 
rank and become more global than domestic, it will increase their perceived quality, which is 
in line with the findings of Steenkamp et al that we discussed previously. 
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Theoretical research as well as the survey statistics both point to the benefits of establishing 
a global brand as opposed to remaining a local one.  Naturally, remaining a local brand has 
its advantages due to being able to adopt a more domestically focused marketing strategy, 
enabling it to tailor its brand to a more specific consumer segment and responding quicker to 
changes in local tastes.  Nonetheless, the increasingly poor quality association to local 
brands and increased favourability towards international brands, especially within the 
younger segment of the population, makes going global a necessity for the majority of 
Chinese manufacturers.       
 
 
2.4 Government initiative 
The need for Chinese brands to venture abroad is further confirmed by the Chinese 
government.  The government in China has implemented a strategy called “Going Global” 
which aims to encourage firms to embrace both domestic as well as foreign markets.  One 
priority under this scheme is to create “large multinational firms with globally recognised 
brands able to compete in the international marketplace.” (Lunding; 2006, pg 6)  The 
strategy is not just an official policy but does have significance and makes the idea of 
investing abroad more attractive for domestic firms.  Child and Rodrigues (2005, pg 404) 
stated that “Those familiar with China rightly emphasize the support that its government is 
giving to the globalization of its leading firms” 
 
The type of support that the state provides takes different forms.  One such form was when 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) reduced the foreign exchange 
controls in 2003.  Previously, SAFE had prevented numerous foreign firm acquisitions by 
Chinese enterprises. (Lunding; 2006, pg 6)  Another form of support from the state comes 
via offering favourable loans and credit to help firms finance overseas activity.  The example 
given by Lunding (2006, pg 6) was the recent decision by the China Development Bank to 
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extend Huawei, a leading telecoms manufacturer, a $10 billion line of credit to help fund its 
overseas expansion.  Given the Chinese government’s active involvement in trying to 
encourage large domestic firms to go global, it is clear that there is urgency for Chinese 
firms to establish their brands abroad. 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
Throughout this chapter arguments have been presented that clarify the need for Chinese 
firms to establish global brands.  The global value chain demonstrated that in order for 
Chinese firms to exploit more sustainable and profitable competitive advantages they need to 
expand more into downstream segments.  The more generic benefits of going global were 
outlined using theory from Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) and then applied to the case of 
Chinese firms.  Furthermore, research was presented that showed being a global brand has 
advantages in itself and that the prestige associated with it is of particularly benefit in the 
current Chinese consumer environment.  Lastly, the need to develop global brands was 
reiterated by the initiative implemented by the Chinese government. 
 
Although the need for Chinese firms to go global is established, building a internationally 
recognized brand is not an easy process and Chinese firms seem to be at a particular 
disadvantage.  The unique challenges that Chinese firms face will be outline in the next 
chapter.   
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3. Obstacles and challenges for Chinese branding 
3.1 Historical factors (1949 – 1978) 
For many centuries China was a civilisation at the forefront of development.  It lead the 
world in innovation and progression within science, medicine, and the arts.  However, 
during the 19th and early 20th century China was “beset by civil unrest, major famines, 
military defeats, and foreign occupation.”(www.cia.gov)  Scientific and academic 
progression halted and focus was given to national security and coping with food shortages.  
After World War II the sovereignty of the country was again secured and the People’s 
Republic of China was officially established on October 1, 1949.  The country was to be 
governed by the Chinese Communist Party under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong and 
Beijing was declared the national capital.  In an attempt to gain an overview of the 
communist era prior to the onset of the free-market reforms starting in 1978, we can divide 
the period up into four phases of “Chinese industrial governance”(Child; 1994, pg 35):  
 
1. Central planning (1953-57) 
This was a period of massive transition to socialism and saw the implementation of China’s 
first five-year plan (1953-7). The five-year plan stressed a centralized planning system and 
followed a Stalinist Soviet approach.  Banking, Industry and Trade were all nationalised.  
Production plans were established by municipal and provincial planning authorities, which 
then simply handed these down to the factories.  Collectivisation of agriculture also took 
place and by 1956 it was said to be 90% completed.(www-chaos.umd.edu)  Private 
enterprise practically ceased to exist in China. 
 
In the summer of 1956 the government loosened up the political environment in an attempt 
to encourage Chinese intellectual and cultural figures to discuss the Communist Party and its 
programs.  This was termed the “Hundred Flowers Campaign” and was named after the 
motto that was used to promote the discussion: “Let a hundred flowers bloom: let a hundred 
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schools of thought contend.”(www.wikipedia.org)  At first the invitation was met with 
scepticism but by mid-1957 the public increasingly voiced their criticism.  This came as a 
surprise to government leaders and was of great embarrassment to Mao.  In July 1957 Mao 
declared the campaign over and blamed it on the high level of unhealthy political criticism.  
In a further reaction to the unexpected criticism, the government implemented an Anti-
Rightist Campaign and many of the critics were either punished or killed.   
 
2. Decentralisation and the Great Leap Forward (1958–61) 
In 1958 the Chinese Communist Party launched “The Great Leap Forward”, which signaled 
a break away from the Stalinist Soviet model previously followed.  The belief was that if 
people were more ideologically motivated and national resources were utilized more 
effectively, then economic and technical development would be greater than during the first 
five-year plan.  Large agricultural cooperatives (communes) were established and 
ideological instruction was increased.  Furthermore, bonus payments to industrial workers 
were substantially reduced, while technical and managerial staffs were not eligible for 
bonuses.  The Great Leap Forward was an economic failure and many died due to shortage 
of food.  
 
During this period the government also engaged upon a path of administrative 
decentralization.  The control over the majority of industrial firms was passed from the 
central government and on to the provincial governments.  Factory directors were also given 
slightly more decision power, with the number of mandatory targets imposed decreasing 
from twelve to four.(Child; 1994, pg 36)  Also, foreign relations with Russia started to 
deteriorate and in mid-1959 Russia withdrew all their advisers and reduced or cancelled their 
economic and technical aid.  
 
3. The period of readjustment (1962-65) 
The period of readjustment was born out of the reduction in agricultural output in the three 
years leading to 1962.  In addition, industrial output also declined substantially in 1961.  The 
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readjustment that occurred was mainly an increase in central planning.  There was more 
emphasis placed on the hierarchical structure within factories and the division of tasks 
amongst employee.  However, factory directors were made more responsible for plant 
operations, but their actions were now more directed by the central government than before. 
 
In an attempt to prevent the apparent capitalist trend, Mao Zedong implemented the Socialist 
Education Movement.  The Movement was started in order to reinstate the public’s belief in 
the virtue of Socialism.  It was in essence a type of work-study program where schooling 
was reduced and replaced by work in the communes and factories.  It even forced 
intellectuals to contribute with manual labour as a means to teach them that aims of the party 
were more important than their individual areas of expertise. 
 
4. The Cultural Revolution (1966-76) 
The Cultural Revolution was a period where Mao Zedong proceeded to regain the power and 
influence he once had, mainly by trying to discredit anyone who did not support him fully.  
The importance of ideology and politics was greatly stressed and had an increasing effect on 
the economy and industry.  “Piece wages and bonuses were sharply reduced or eliminated 
altogether.  Competitive, individual and material incentive was rejected in favour of co-
operative, collective and moral incentive.” (Child; 1994, pg 37)       
 
After the souring of foreign relations in the previous periods a greater sensitivity was 
assigned international relations.  China attempted to improve relations with the west and in 
particularly with the USA.  The result of these initiatives was witnessed in 1972 by the visit 
of President Richard M. Nixon.  Diplomatic ties were even developed with Japan in 
September 1972.   
 
It is clear to see that the above time periods describe an era that was in no way conducive to 
the development of branding expertise in China.  Due to the lack of private businesses and 
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hampering of free-thought, there was no need for products to be branded commercially nor 
was there the chance to build knowledge on the subject.  Even foreign assistance and know-
how was squandered.  In the meantime firms in the west were being exposed to markets and 
gradually learning how to deal with competition.  However, eventually China realised the 
benefits of private enterprise and international trade and began reforming the economy.       
 
 
3.2 Opening up and market reform 
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and witnessing the unsatisfactory performance of the 
economy during the previous decades, Deng Xiaoping launched economic reforms and 
open-door programs in 1978.  After more than 20 years of reforms and opening up to foreign 
businesses the Chinese economy has undergone impressive economic growth.  The below 
graph clearly demonstrates the huge growth that China has experienced. 
(www.worldbank.org) 
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The growth and reforms have had a great impact on Chinese businesses.  They are now able 
to trade more easily with the outside world as well as within China.  Furthermore, between 
1978 and 2001 China’s GDP per capita grew on average by 8.1% on an annual basis.(Wang; 
2003, pg 4)  This means that Chinese consumers have more cash to spend, which means the 
market is much more profitable and attractive for firms to enter.  As a result of the increasing 
competition in the marketplace and being subjected to the practice of foreign companies, 
Chinese firms are starting to see the benefits of branding.   
 
In addition, the infrastructure and characteristics of the Chinese consumer are becoming 
more conducive to branding campaigns.  The table below highlights some of the 
developments that have taken place which make it easier for firms to reach consumers 
(Wang; 2003, pg 8): 
 
ITEMS 1978 2001 
Urbanization 17,9 30,4
Rural Annual Per Capita Net Income (US $) 78,6 285,7
Urban Annual Per Capita Disposable Income (US $) 185,9 828,5
Number of TV sets in Rural Areas (per 100 households) 0 105,2
Number of colour TV sets in Urban Areas (per 100 households) 0 120,5
Number of Personal Computers (per 1000 people)  0 15,9
Number of Internet Hosts (per 1000 people) 0 9,8
Access to Mobile Phones (sets per 100 persons) 0 11,4
Access to Telephones (sets per 100 persons) 0,45 14,5
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The economic developments since 1978 have been favourable for business development.  
The ability for firms to govern themselves and invest as they see best has improved 
remarkably.  Also, being subjected to businesses from foreign nations has given domestic 
firms an insight into how global firms conduct business.  The rise of competition and 
increase in business independence, along with the developments of consumer characteristics, 
are all factors that promote the establishing of brands.  However, there are still regulations in 
place in the Chinese economy that hinders the development of private businesses, and thus 
reduces the likelihood of the development of efficient global brands. 
 
3.2.1 Current obstacles 
A main obstacle for free market competition that is cited in various articles is the large 
number of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China.  These enterprises work under special 
conditions and thus distort the market for privately-owned businesses.  The OECD 
Economic Survey of China 2005 claimed that more than 35% of all state-owned companies 
were not earning a positive rate of return.  Nakagane (2000, pg 4) listed four main reasons 
why Chinese state enterprises tend to be so inefficient: 
• Lack of enterprises’ autonomy 
• “Soft budget constraint”, SOEs are protected from bankruptcy by the supervising 
governments. 
• “Historical legacies” and social burdens borne by SOEs.  For example, it is extremely 
difficult to dismiss workers employed by the state. 
• Low quality of enterprise managers, because they are selected based on their position in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy and not business ability. 
 
Even though the number of SOEs in China has been reduced since its WTO accession in 
2000 (Dayal-Gulati and Lee; 2005, pg 12), they still play a vital role in the economy.  
According to Fortune magazine the government still owned 98 out of the 100 biggest 
Chinese firms in 2002.(Zeng and Williamson; 2003, pg 94) 
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Within the Chinese financial system there are also certain features that limit the development 
of private enterprises.  One of these features is the lack of privately owned financial 
institutions.  Unlike the transition economies of Eastern Europe that privatised their banks at 
an early stage, in China “only very limited parts of the banking and financial sector have so 
far been opened to international firms.” (Child and Tse; 2001, pg 10)  The lack of privately 
owned banks can be witnessed in credit allocation, where the vast majority of loans are 
supplied by the four main state-owned banks.  According to the OECD (www.oecd.org) 
these institutions supplied 90% of all the loans provided by the banking industry, and almost 
75% of all loans to businesses in 2000.  Naturally, such a high concentration does not reflect 
positively on the level of competition in the market.     
 
Another feature of the Chinese financial market that seems unfavourable is the high 
concentration of loans that go to SOEs.  The OECD (www.oecd.org) predicts that at least 
80% of the loans from the main state-owned banks, and almost 75% of the loans from 
commercial banks go to SOEs.  SOEs also tend to enjoy preferred access to equity and bond 
market financing.  The damage to competitiveness that this loan allocation causes is, as 
previously mentioned, further exacerbated by the fact that more than a third of all SOEs do 
not earn a positive rate of return.  These statistics demonstrate the favourability that SOEs 
receive from the Government. 
 
The Chinese government has in the past exercises a fixed-exchange rate policy, pegging its 
value to the US Dollar.  The official value of the Yuan has fluctuated a fair amount the last 
couple of decades, starting at 1.5 to the dollar in 1981 and equalling 8.28 to the dollar in 
mid-1995 (Lardy; 2005, pg 43).  Since 1995 the Yuan has not been revalued and complaints 
arose, mainly from the USA because of the expanding trade deficit they were experiencing 
with China.  However, in 2005 the Chinese government decided to implement a “managed, 
floating exchange rate system”(http://news.xinhuanet.com) and on July 21st they modified 
the exchange rate changing it by 2% to 8.11 Yuan to the dollar (www.money.cnn.com).  The 
USA welcomed the change but said it was only a small step in the right direction.  Their 
argument is that the Yuan is 40% undervalued and its artificial low value acts as a subsidy to 
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exporting firms in China because it makes their products cheaper and more competitive in 
the US market. 
 
Seeing as China entered the WTO in 2001 it is in theory not allowed to provide subsidies to 
businesses.  However, as we have demonstrated above, SOE favourability and the fixed 
exchange rate can work as subsidies.  There are also other instances where the subsidies to 
businesses are more direct and as a result have been met by objections from importing 
nations.  For example, the EU has in April this year (2006) started to impose a 20% duty on 
shoes imported from China because it claims it has “identified clear evidence of disguised 
subsidies and unfair state intervention to the leather footwear sector in 
China”.(www.news.bbc.co.uk)  Even though the Chinese businesses will benefit initially, 
the subsidies will either be reduced in accordance to WTO rules or opposing actions will be 
taken by importing nations, and then the competitiveness of Chinese businesses will suffer. 
 
In order for branding to fully flourish and develop, the Chinese government must attempt to 
establish an atmosphere within which private firms can prosper and reap the gains of their 
competitive advantages.  Although the Chinese government is slowly deregulating its 
markets and has stated it aims to establish a “market system with socialist characteristics” 
(Child and Tse; 2001, pg 8), it still has a way to go and at present the economy is better 
described as a socialist system with market characteristics. 
 
 
3.3 Provincial differences 
The below map outlines the different provinces and divisions within the Chinese state 
(www.wikipedia.org): 
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As a result of China’s vast size and population the country has been divided into different 
provinces, whose boundaries were mainly formed during the Ming Dynasty.  The division of 
China into provinces was initially implemented not only as a means to keep order over the 
large nation, but also to break up large ethnic groupings and thereby reduce the chance of a 
organised uprising against the central power.  In addition, provinces were encouraged to 
become self-sufficient so that in case one province was lost the other provinces would not be 
deeply affected with the reduction in trade possibilities (Zeng and Williamson; 2003, ). 
 
Today the self-sufficiency of provinces is not a primary goal, but strong provincial borders 
still exist.  The differences between the regions can still clearly be seen today if one looks to 
the economic performance of the various provinces.  In general it is the provinces of the 
South-East coastal region that tend to be more industrialized and perform better than the 
other provinces.(Golley; 2002, pg 771)  Economic inequality amongst the provinces has 
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meant that the infrastructure present in each province varies widely.  While a well developed 
province like Guangdong may have well maintained distribution networks, reliable sources 
of input materials, and widely spread power supply; other provinces like Gansu may lack 
such infrastructure.  These differences in infrastructure have a direct effect on the manner in 
which business is carried out.  These differences can act as barriers to inter-regional trade 
because firms are forced to drastically adapt their business approach to each region they do 
business in. 
 
The large distances between the various provinces, economic inequality, and focus on self-
sufficiency has contributed to a significant difference in culture amongst these provinces.  
Every nation has different regional cultures, but in China’s case the differences are very 
substantial.  These cultural differences can also act as barriers to trade between regions.  
Firstly, a province may have an unfavourable view of another province and hence will be 
reluctant to purchase goods originating from that province.  Secondly, the cultural 
differences will affect what the consumers in specific provinces look for in products or find 
appropriate in marketing.  Therefore firms are forced to further adapt their business approach 
according to region.   
 
However, the greatest barrier to inter-provincial trade is the decentralisation and fiscal 
autonomy given to the individual provinces.  Administrative decentralisation also occurred 
during the Great Leap, but the fiscal contracting system that was introduced in the early 
1980’s had a greater effect.  The system was such that “each province was responsible for 
collecting tax revenues in its region and then entitled to retain a high proportion of the 
marginal tax revenue.” (Li; 1998)  This naturally leads to an economic rivalry between 
provinces and resulted in significant barriers to trade.   
 
An example of such a barrier is the implementation of production standards for taxis, which 
are manipulated to ensure that only local factories fulfil the required specifications. (Walters 
and Samiee; 2003, pg 101)  Another example of such a barrier is the requirement for 
businesses to present the local government with all their capital purchasing plans.  The local 
 32 
officials in turn frequently demand that preference be given to regional suppliers. (Shirk; 
2002)  Furthermore, local governments impose taxes on products that are not manufactured 
in their specific region. (Zeng and Williamson; 2003) 
 
The existence of the inter-provincial trade barriers and economic rivalry that I have outlined 
above can go a far way in explaining the slow development of large national corporations in 
China.  Firms have been discouraged to venture outside their provinces and their ability to 
exploit economies of scale has been limited.  This also explains “why there are many 
regional brands but few national brands in the country.” (Zeng and Williamson; 2003, pg 
93)  This is another factor contributing to why Chinese firms have been so slow to establish 
global brands. 
 
3.4 Lack of consumer research 
Consumer research is a vital part of branding because knowledge of the consumer is what 
makes a branding strategy successful.  Before the start of the “reform and opening up” 
period, China had no marketing research.  Even basic information regarding the economy in 
general was often not up to date or reliable.  The first marketing research company to be 
established in China was the Guangzhou Market Research Company, which emerged in 
1988 as part of the state-run Guangzhou Soft Science Company. (Lee and Saklani; 2002)  
The first privately owned marketing research firm was established in 1990 and was called 
South China Marketing Research co. Ltd.  Already by 2002 there were approximately 400 
domestic marketing research companies in China and the majority of top global marketing 
research firms had a presence there. (Lee and Saklani; 2002)      
 
Regardless of the rapid growth and promise of the marketing research industry in China, it 
has a long way to go to reach the standard of the research companies in the west.  One big 
obstacle that marketing research firms face in China is the lack of infrastructure to carry out 
surveys.  For example, whereas in developed markets research firms rely heavily on mail 
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surveys, in China this type of research is nonexistent due to unreliability of the postal 
system.  Similarly, the telephone is also not used frequently when conducting surveys 
because many respondents do not have a phone. 
 
The majority of surveys are conducted face-to-face in central locations or by going door-to-
door.  This presents a problem when trying to conduct quantitative research because this 
method is not very cost-effective.  The internet presents a good channel to conduct cost-
effective quantitative marketing research, but the internet penetration rate in China is still 
very low.  In 2005 the CIA fact book (www.cia.gov) ranked China 43rd in the world 
according to the total number of internet hosts, which in relation to its population size is not 
impressive.  Iceland, with its minimal population of less than 300,000, still had more internet 
hosts than the whole of China. 
 
As far as qualitative marketing research is concerned there exist cultural obstacles.  The 
Chinese culture, like many east-Asian cultures, places a great importance on the issue of 
face-saving.  This is the belief that not agreeing with, or criticising someone is a severe 
insults and will result in “loss of face”.  This breeds a situation where the respondent will 
agree with the majority of what the interviewer is saying and will rarely criticise a brand or 
product.  Furthermore, in focus groups the Chinese tradition of silence will pose another 
obstacle as it is believed that “those who know do not speak, and those who do speak do not 
know”. (Walters and Samiee; 2003, pg 100) 
 
Other major obstacle to marketing research in China includes its geographic size and 
diversity of markets.  As mentioned previously, provinces in China vary immensely in 
everything from income level, infrastructural development and cultural values.  The stark 
contrast of the average consumer can clearly be demonstrated with the below table, which 
was constructed using findings from a 1997 Gallup Research Company Ltd survey (Cui and 
Liu; 2000, pg 62):  
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The table shows that in North China 26.4% of consumers have a college education or 
beyond, while in the North West only 2.8% have that level of education.  These types of 
disparities represent a real challenge when trying to gain a unified overview of the Chinese 
customer. 
 
As is demonstrated above, the challenge faced by marketing researchers in China is by no 
means small.  In addition to the fact that tested and proved western research methods can not 
be directly adopted in China (due to linguistic, cultural, and infrastructural differences), the 
Chinese consumer is changing so rapidly that companies are in need of ever more marketing 
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information. (Lee and Saklani; 2002)    The infancy of the marketing research industry in 
China poses a significant challenge to Chinese firms when they try to establish Global 
brands because they are not accustomed to either gathering, or interpreting marketing 
research data.  
 
 
3.5 Cultural differences 
Culture can be defined as “the way in which a group of people solves problems and 
reconciles dilemmas.” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner; 2003, pg 6)  Culture is a very 
broad concept and it is impossible to pin-point exactly what or where it is.  However, 
culture, to a certain degree, dictates the way in which a group of people interpret certain 
situations and what actions they feel are appropriate in these situations.  Therefore it seems 
obvious that culture will have a immense effect not only on marketing research as discussed 
before, but also on the way consumers relate to brands and how best to establish positive 
associations towards a brand. 
 
If the Chinese culture is very far removed from the cultures of the main western markets, 
which happens to be where branding theory is most developed, then not only will Chinese 
firms have to modify the existing brand theory when applying it to their home country, but 
also they have to establish an understanding of an entirely different customer base when 
entering western markets.  Getting to know your customer is the most important aspect of 
effective branding and therefore cultural differences present a substantial obstacle when 
attempting to establish a global brand. 
 
Evaluating individual cultures is impractical because everyone is influenced by a certain 
culture and maintaining objectivity is impossible.  However, comparing different cultures on 
various dimensions is more feasible.  This is exactly what the Dutch researcher Geert 
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Hofstede did and using his findings we can show that the Chinese culture is indeed very far 
removed from that of the main western economies.  For the purpose of this comparison I 
have chosen to use USA, Germany, and the United Kingdom since they are the largest 
economies in the western world.(www.worldbank.org) 
 
Hofstede (2005) developed 5 dimensions upon which he ranked different nations: 
• Power Distance 
Power distance relates to the extent to which individuals in a culture accept an unequal 
distribution of power within the society.  The Malaysian culture ranked first on power 
distance meaning they are comfortable and often predisposed to certain individuals being 
more equal than others.  The Austrian culture ranked last on power distance, which implies 
that they believe inequalities should be minimized and hierarchies should only be 
established for convenience. 
 
• Individualism 
The degree to which individual decision-making is valued and the responsibility individuals 
feel towards their groups are what define this aspect.  Individualism ranks highest in the 
USA and it implies that the interest of the individual often prevails over the interest of the 
group.  The Guatemalan culture scores lowest on the individualism ranking and is therefore 
a collectivist culture where great importance is placed on close ties with ones extended 
family and communities. 
 
• Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance measures the degree to which cultures avoid ambiguous situations 
and desire formal rules and procedures.  The Greek culture ranks highest on this dimensions 
and it represents a societal concern for the lack of stability and a risk averse attitude.  
Singapore is ranked as the culture with lowest uncertainty avoidance.  People in this culture 
are less risk averse and are comfortable with a greater level of individual autonomy. 
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• Masculinity 
This dimension relates to the degree to which society values assertiveness, ambition, 
achievement and material possessions, over the quality of life.  Slovakia scores highest on 
the masculinity dimension meaning there is a great importance placed on material wealth 
within the society and that gender roles are distinct.  The Swedish culture scored lowest on 
the masculinity dimension meaning they value the quality of life more and believe there is a 
overlap between gender roles. 
 
• Long-Term Orientation 
Long-term orientation refers to the degree of concern with which a culture addresses the 
future and the value of thrift versus the degree of value given the past and present.  China 
scores highest on this dimension and it implies its citizens are focused on long-term results 
and tend to be sparing with resources.  The Pakistani culture scores lowest on the long-term 
orientation ranking, making it a short-term oriented culture focused more on instant results 
and social obligations. 
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The above graph shows the scores that the different countries were given by Hofstede (2001) 
for each of his dimensions.  It is clear to see that even though the western cultures are not all 
identical; the Chinese culture is the one which differentiates itself the most.  In the 
dimensions of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance the cultures are quite similar, while in 
the remaining three dimensions China clearly stands out. 
 
The most obvious difference can be witnessed in the long-term orientation dimension.  
Whilst the Chinese consumer may tend to be frugal and sparing with resources, the western 
consumer may appear more willing to spend.  Furthermore, the western consumer will 
expect results at once, whereas the Chinese consumer will be more patient when reaching a 
conclusion.  The low level of individualism in the Chinese culture may imply that consumers 
from that culture use brands to signal an alliance to a group, in contrast to western 
consumers who may use brands to differentiate themselves.  As far as the power distance 
dimension is concerned it might mean that Chinese consumers are willing to trust in 
information supplied to them from a source with high status, whereas western consumers 
might be more critical. 
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The above paragraph outlines and tries to explain what the cultural differences might mean 
for branding.  However, culture is complex and trying to use the simplistic dimension scores 
above to determine ones branding approach will surely result in failure.  What the 
dimensions do tell us is that the Chinese culture, and therefore the typical Chinese consumer, 
is very different from that of the main western economies.  Therefore, attempting to transfer 
branding practices from China to one of the western countries will be much more 
problematic than for example transferring branding practices within the western countries 
(e.g. from Germany to the USA).  
 
 
3.6 Lack of intellectual property rights 
Intellectual property (IP) can be defined as “A product of the intellect that has commercial 
value, including copyrighted property such as literary or artistic works, and ideational 
property, such as patents, appellations of origin, business methods, and industrial 
processes.” (www.dictionary.com)  In most countries Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are 
enforced, which punish manufacturers from counterfeiting brands.  In China the notion of IP 
Rights is still a infant one.  The government did show some willingness to try and combat 
Intellectual Property Rights violations when it in 2001 signed the “Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”. (Wang; 2003, pg 93)   However, a lack of 
stringent enforcement of these laws has done little to prevent markets from openly selling 
fake brands and manufacturers from producing them. 
 
According to a study by the World Customs Organization (http://www.atkearney.com), 
counterfeiting accounts for as much as 5 to 7 percent of global merchandise trade.  This is 
equivalent to approximately US$512 billion.  This is no small figure and estimates show that 
two-thirds of the world’s fake and pirated goods stem from China.  IPR violations are a great 
burden on Chinese firms, not only the US$24 billion loss in annual sales 
 40 
(http://www.atkearney.com), but also its detrimental affect on the ability and willingness of 
firms to develop brands.   
 
When brands are counterfeited or copied, the original creator of the brand is basically stolen 
from because the investment in his brand is devalued.  When consumers purchase fake 
products the original brand loses out on a potential sale, but more importantly the image of 
the brand is tarnished.  Manufacturers of counterfeit goods will naturally use inferior raw 
materials when copying a product; therefore the customer will have a less favourable 
experience and associate this to the original brand, thereby devaluing the brand.  This loss in 
brand value acts as a disincentive to invest in branding and acts as a real detriment to the 
development of strong national brands.  It therefore comes as no surprise that “most Chinese 
firms are using pricing strategies to compete.” (Child and Tse; 2001, pg 12) 
 
The lack of IPRs further limits the development of Chinese branding because foreign brands 
are reluctant to enter the market for fear of being counterfeited.  Therefore, domestic 
companies are unable to learn from the branding strategies and ideas implemented by their 
foreign counterparts.  It is clear that in order for Chinese branding to develop and fully 
flourish, Intellectual Property Rights must be upheld.  Even though the past has been bleak 
there are signs that in the future China may discover the virtues of intellectual property.  In 
February this year (2006), we witnessed for the first time a Chinese IT company ( Netac 
from Shenzhen) taking an American company (PNY Technologies from New Jersey) to 
court on grounds of patent infringement, usually it has been the other way around. (The 
Economist, 4/1/2006) 
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3.7 Country image 
When consumers try to decide what product they should purchase, many attributes are taken 
into consideration.  The ranking and importance of the various attributes changes depending 
on the purchase situation and product category, but mostly price and product quality have 
the majority of influence. However, when consumers can not easily differentiate the 
selection of offerings on the basis of these two attributes, they will use other factors to infer 
the quality of a product.  One such factor that a consumer may use is the country of origin of 
the product. (Han; 1989, pg 223)  Here a consumer evaluates a products attributes using 
her/his country image, which can be define as the “consumers’ general perceptions of 
quality for products made in a given country”. (Han 1989, pg 222)  
 
Naturally, country image is very specific to product categories.  For example, an Afghan rug 
would be perceived to be of much greater quality than an Afghan microwave.  Similarly, the 
importance of country image in the purchase decision also differs according to product 
category.  Jaffe and Nebenzahl (2001, pg 91) showed that Cars (54%), Clothing (51%), 
Electronics (31%), and Small Appliances (15%) are the product categories for which country 
of origin is of most importance.  Apart from cars, the four biggest product groups exported 
from China in 2004 fall into the remaining three categorisations.(www.intracen.org)  This 
goes to show that the country image of China can play a significance role in the success of 
its brands abroad. 
 
Even though the influence of country image on purchase decisions may vary immensely 
according to product type and nationality of consumer in question, it will nonetheless be of a 
general importance.  This is especially true for China.  The lack of exports of high-quality 
Chinese products or brands in the past means that consumers around the world have little 
knowledge of Chinese brands and can not infer a product’s quality from their brand name.  
As a result they will make use of other product attributes and most likely attach a greater 
value to country image.  Unfortunately, the country image for China is rather negative and 
this is reflected in brand perceptions.  In 2005 www.brandchannel.com (Swystun, Burt and 
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Ly; 2005) conducted a survey on what people associated with Chinese brands and the top 
five responses were: 
1. Cheap 
2. Poor Value 
3. Poor Quality 
4. Unreliable 
5. Unsophisticated 
 
Having accepted that the average consumer will place greater importance on country image 
for products from China, it is a further challenge for Chinese brands to overcome their 
country’s unfavourable image. 
 
Theory within this field has pointed to two types of sources that shape a consumers country 
image, Halo and Summary Construct. (Jaffe and Nebenzahl 2001, pg 42)  The Halo 
construct is prominent when the consumer has little or no knowledge of brands from a 
country and thus uses alternative knowledge to form his his/her perception of the product.  
The alternative knowledge used by consumers might be the economic and political 
development in the country, and also ones opinions towards people from that country.  The 
Summary construct is a factor when the consumer does have prior experience, either directly 
or indirectly (eg. through word of mouth), with brands from this country.  The consumer 
then utilizes these past brand experiences and applies them to the evaluation of the new 
unknown brand.  As the consumer gathers more and more experiences with brands from a 
country, the Summary construct will play the major role in forming his/her country image.  
On the other hand, when the political developments of a familiar country are seen as extreme 
by the consumer, the Halo construct may play a leading role in forming ones country image.  
A good example of this was the anti-French sentiment in the USA during the Iraq war, which 
resulted in “freedom-fries”. (www.news.bbc.co.uk) 
 
According to the theory above, improving ones country image should be done through 
maintaining positive political relations and exporting brands that leave consumers with 
favourable experiences.  The Summary construct definitely has the strongest influence of the 
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two and hence China should clearly focus more on exporting brands with quality products 
than trying to boost its political or economic image.  The process of improving ones country 
image is a long and delicate one, but it has been done before as we have seen with brands 
from South Korea and Japan. (Papadopoulos and Heslop; 1993, pg 104) 
 
 
3.8 Summary 
In this chapter we have outlined the main factors responsible for the limited number of 
global Chinese brands.  It started with historical factors that gave China a late start in the 
race to establish global brands.  Then when reform eventually took place, the Chinese 
economy became more and more conducive to branding.  However, certain barriers to 
competition still exist and thus Chinese entrepreneurs do not yet have the same possibilities 
or incentives to develop global brands as their western counterparts.  The historical 
independence and substantial differences between the provinces in China makes it difficult 
for companies to establish large national brands, which may eventually become global 
brands.  The lack of consumer research has meant that Chinese firms have little experience 
in gathering and interpreting such data when developing a brand.  Naturally, the cultural 
differences documented in this chapter also pose a great obstacle to Chinese firms trying to 
build brands in western markets.  Furthermore, the lack of IPRs has meant that firms have 
mainly competed on price and the unfavourable country image of China has given little 
opportunity or incentive for firms to focus on the global market.           
 
Having established both the need for Chinese firms to establish global brands and the 
difficulties they face in doing so, the next chapter will outline the different strategies that a 
brand can adopt when attempting to enter foreign markets. 
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4. How to develop a global brand 
4.1 Relevant foreign market entry methods 
The theories we utilized here are foreign market entry-strategies because in essence that is 
what the firms are doing, trying to make a name for themselves in foreign markets.  Effort 
has been made to focus on the consequences these strategies will have on branding and 
Chinese firms in particular.  Lasserre (2003; chapter 7) lists six main forms of foreign 
market entry: 
• Representative Office 
This form of entry entails sending a manager to the foreign market in order to collect 
information, establish contacts, negotiate distribution, and organise direct sales.  This is a 
strategy with minimal risk and can be seen as a stepping-stone into the foreign market. 
 
• Local agent or Distributor 
This is where the firm appoints a local sales agent or distributor in the foreign market.  A 
local sale agent would be in charge of selling the firms product, while a distributor would be 
concerned with the logistics, stocking and billing.  This is also a strategy with limited risk 
and a form of testing the market.  
 
• Licensing or Franchising agreement. 
Here a foreign firm is given the permission to sell products in their home-market on the 
behalf of another firm.  The foreign firm then pays a fee up-front and some form of royalties 
in exchange for being able to utilize the other firm’s technology or brand name.  This form 
of entry requires little capital involvement but does have some inherent risks. 
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• Joint Venture 
This is when two firms create a partnership and invest capital in common infrastructure.  In 
regards to brands this is a form of branding alliance and the advantages and disadvantages of 
this strategy will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
• Acquisition 
This is when a firm enters a foreign market by simply buying a local competitor, thereby 
making use of the already established distribution networks, suppliers, and customer 
relationships.  This is a time efficient strategy but often does not come cheap. 
 
• Wholly-owned subsidiary 
Here a firm enters a foreign market with full force.  It sets up a local office and hires some 
local staff, but is usually run by management from the home-country.  This requires 
significant research and funding, but the firm has full responsibility and control over the 
division. 
 
Each form of entry outlined above obviously has a long list of advantages and 
disadvantages, but in this chapter the focus will be on the latter two entry forms; Acquisition 
and Wholly-owned subsidiary.  In an attempt to justify this focus reference to Lasserre 
(2003, pg 189) will be made, who mentions “timing of entry” as a key factor in influencing 
the entry mode.  He distinguishes between four phases: 
 
1. The Premature phase – where there is a lack of purchasing power or an absence of 
demand for the product/service. 
2. The Window phase – where the market is in the take-off stage but competitors have 
not yet fully established themselves there. 
3. The Competitive Growth phase – where some competitors are present in the market 
and the market is exhibiting high-growth rates. 
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4. The Mature phase – where competitors are well established in the market and high-
growth rates are no longer evident. 
 
In regards to Chinese firms entering western markets, the timing phase that seems most 
suitable is the Mature phase since western markets are well entrenched with competitors and 
growth rates in established consumer goods markets are not astoundingly high.  Having 
determined that the Mature phase is the relevant phase, Lassere (2003, pg 191) states that in 
this phase “acquisition or direct investment with an innovative product is generally the only 
way to enter.”, hence justifying our focus on these two entry modes.    
 
Further justification of our focus on these two entry modes can be witnessed when looking at 
the below 2-by-2 diagram.  This diagram is also taken from Lasserre (2003, pg 192):    
     
 
The horizontal axis represents the extent of ownership control that a firm desires in the 
foreign market.  In the case of branding, full control is necessary because developing 
consumer associations to a brand is a delicate process and consistency is extremely 
important.  Therefore if a foreign subsidiary acts in a way that is not consistent with other 
aspects of the brand, consumers will become confused and eventually develop unfavourable 
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associations towards that brand.  As a result Chinese firms should seek full control of foreign 
operations. 
 
The vertical axis represents the level to which the firm is investing in competencies that add 
value.  Building a brand is an intricate process and can not be achieved through limiting 
foreign operations to administrative activities.  Furthermore, a main reason for Chinese firms 
to build a global brand was to engage in the more value-adding activities of the value chain, 
therefore Chinese firms should not take this investment lightly. 
 
Given the two arguments above, Chinese firms should engage in the entry modes found in 
the top-right segment of the 2-by-2 diagram.  These are again either Wholly-owned 
subsidiary or dominant acquisition.  The following sections of this chapter will investigate 
these two entry modes in more detail.  Although discussed separately, it is important to note 
that these strategies are not mutually exclusive and a firm can utilize aspects of both 
strategies at the same time. 
 
4.2 Organic expansion 
Given that the foreign market does not impose any domestic ownership restrictions, such as 
in the United Arab Emirates where at least 51% of company shares must be owned by locals 
(http://www.government.ae), a firm can enter a market by setting up their own wholly-
owned subsidiary (or organic expansion as it is also known).  This form of market entry has 
numerous advantages and disadvantages. 
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4.2.1 Advantages 
As we mentioned previously, when you start your foreign operations from scratch you have 
absolute control over your business activities.  Within the legal framework of the host 
country, you get to decide what suppliers you deal with, what distributors you deal with, 
what type of marketing campaign you want to run, and who you want to employ.  The ability 
to make these decisions without having to debate with a local partner can save time, ensure 
your subsidiary integrates well with the rest of your organisation, and help maintain a 
consistent image in the different markets you operate.   
 
The majority of business activities the subsidiary undertakes will influence the associations 
consumers have to the brand, such as what channels you use to distribute your goods and 
what people you employ.  By starting afresh you can build these associations from scratch, 
whereas if you take over already established operations you have to breakdown the existing 
consumers associations before you can establish new ones.  Here a firm also runs the risk of 
confusing the consumer through inconsistent brand images.  Furthermore, establishing a 
dominant presence in a foreign market from scratch signals significant resources and thus a 
certain level of product quality to consumers. (Child and Rodrigues; 2005, pg 398) 
 
In chapter 3 we highlighted the difference in culture between China and other western 
countries.  These differences naturally affect corporate culture and management styles within 
firms.  Employees in western nations might not be fond of Chinese management styles and 
corporate culture.  By hiring new local employees and training them from scratch there is a 
higher likelihood that they will accept these different practices, than if one attempted to alter 
already established procedures.  In addition, it increases the probability that they, as 
ambassadors of the brand, project a positive and consistent image of the brand. 
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4.2.2 Disadvantages 
One of the largest drawbacks of establishing a wholly-owned subsidiary is the amount of 
resources it demands.  Firstly, the firm should conduct a feasibility study on the foreign 
market it plans to enter and decide where it should settle.  Secondly, the firm needs to 
familiarize itself with local institutions and legal requirements.  Thirdly, it must pay for the 
real estate, construction and interior set-up of the office.  Fourthly, it has to cover training 
expenses for employees and conduct market research on how best to target customers.  
Lastly, the firm needs to try and establish business relationships with suppliers and 
distributors.  In the case of Chinese firms, the funding of this type of expansion may not be 
as big of a concern as for other firms due to the support they receive from their government, 
but it is still an issue. 
 
The above cost dimension also highlights the amount of time it takes to set-up such a 
wholly-owned subsidiary.  In addition, once the above tasks are completed there is still the 
long process of establishing strong and positive associations towards the brand in the mind 
of the consumer.  Given the arguments presented in chapter 2 for the urgency of Chinese 
firms to establish global brands, time is of the essence.  “Japanese and South Korean 
companies like Toyota, Sony and Samsung made the moves from national to global brands 
quite successfully, but it took years.  Analysts say that Chinese companies do not have that 
luxury, because the rapid pace of globalization means that markets are now quickly won and 
lost.” (Barboza; 2005) 
 
Adapting to foreign regulations, as well as more subtle market characteristics, is a difficult 
process.  Without any prior experience to draw on, a newly established subsidiary will face 
many challenges trying to understand local practices.  Starting from scratch may aid in 
training local employees to grasp home-country customs, but is a significant disadvantage 
when it comes to understanding host-country consumers.  The substantial cultural 
differences we mentioned previously will only exacerbate the challenge facing Chinese 
managers.   
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Another disadvantage of this type of entry mode that applies to Chinese firms is the 
increased need for managerial talent.  When expanding operations abroad and making home-
country managers responsible for activities in the host-country there will inevitably be 
demand for more qualified personnel.  Managers in the home-country will also have to 
engage in a broader variety of tasks, such as including the foreign subsidiary in their 
accounts and ensuring they maintain an open channel of communication between 
headquarters and the foreign subsidiary.  Due to the shortage of experienced and well-
educated people in the Chinese labour market, the stretching of managerial capability and 
demand for additional personnel can become a problem. (Child and Rodrigues; 2005, pg. 
398) 
 
4.2.3 Examples  
The Haier Group was incorporated in 1984 and produced only household refrigerators at the 
time, currently however it manufactures a wide range of household electrical appliances, 
15,100 varieties of items in 96 product lines, and exports products to more than 100 
countries. (http://www.haier.com.pk)  Shifting from a collectively-owned enterprise (the 
Qingdao Refrigerator Factory) to a corporation with global presence, the Haier Group 
frequently adapted an organic expansion strategy.   
 
Haier focused on the USA at an early stage and after exporting for 9 years it finally 
established its first overseas manufacturing facility in South Carolina on 30th April 1999.  
This enabled them not only to overcome quota restrictions and potential anti-dumping suits, 
but also to minimise (not eliminate due to their foreign brand) the country of origin effect by 
printing “Made in the USA” on the goods produced there.  This move, in combination with 
the opening of a design centre in Los Angeles, clearly demonstrated Haier’s organic 
internationalization strategy and its attempt to establish a locally recognized brand.  These 
two moves are “examples of Haier America's commitment to the US market”, trying to 
ensure consumers of their quality and long-term obligation (http://www.haieramerica.com).  
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The above steps taken by Haier are both attempts to increase the salience and quality 
perception of the brand value, however, the most obvious action taken by Haier to establish 
their brand abroad was the purchase of the former headquarters of the Greenwich Bank at 
1356 Broadway.  This central location in Manhattan is to become Haier’s headquarters in the 
USA.  The building is far from cost effective but its aim is clear, to signify quality and 
prosperity to its visitors and by-passers.  When engaging in an organic expansion strategy to 
establish your brand abroad, purchasing a plush landmark building in the centre of a leading 
city and posting your brand name on is a strong way to improve the quality associations 
towards your brand, which is what Chinese brands need. 
 
 
4.3 Acquisition expansion 
The alternative strategy to organic expansion is expansion through Acquisitions.  Here the 
firm can simply buy up a foreign competitor and sell their products under the newly acquired 
brand.  Naturally there are occasionally barriers to such actions, such as national legislation 
or the recent upsurge of “economic patriotism” in France, sparked by a bid from Italian Enel 
to acquire the French energy company Suez. (www.news.bbc.co.uk)  The focus of this paper 
is mostly on entering western economies and consumer goods markets where the barriers to 
acquisition tend to be not as significant.  As is the case with all strategies, establishing a 
global brand through acquisitions has its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
4.3.1 Advantages  
The greatest advantage with the Acquisition route is its speed.  Once the target company has 
been purchased the new market entrant has access to its suppliers, distributors, technology 
and management.  Most importantly it can utilize the target firm’s brand name.  Given that 
the brand name evokes positive associations from customers, the new owners of the brand 
can sell their products to customers using this locally trusted brand.  Using the already 
 52 
established brand the new firm can circumvent the long and delicate process of building a 
brand, and limit (not eliminate) the negative country of origin affects. 
 
Another advantage of expanding abroad using acquisitions is that the company utilizes the 
existing market share.  If for example there are 10 equal competitors in the market you are 
attempting to enter, when you buy one of the competitors there are still only 10 players in 
the market and you automatically get 10% market share.  If you enter without an acquisition 
it means there are now 11 players in the market and you have to steal market share away 
from your well entrenched competitors.  It is usually much harder to acquire a new customer 
than keep an existing one.   In addition, when you purchase a firm it prevents other 
competitors from doing so, thereby limiting their ability to strengthen their business through 
acquisition of new technology and customers.  
 
Most firms that are susceptible to being acquired are typically small or not performing so 
well, which means that when taken over by another company there is a chance that the new 
company has some competencies that the old firm was lacking.  If for example a company 
with a strong brand name struggles because of high production costs, then being acquired by 
a Chinese firm with low production costs may solve this problem and result in a turnaround 
performance.  Although in practice often things are not that simple.   
 
When discussing the organic expansion method we mentioned that adapting to subtle market 
characteristics can be a challenge.  When acquiring a foreign business, the staff is already 
trained and has a good understanding of the local market characteristics as well as the 
characteristics of your potential customers.  Furthermore, the Chinese firm can exploit the 
knowledge of its home market by selling goods there under the foreign brand name, thereby 
eluding many of the negative associations Chinese consumers have of goods manufactured 
in China.  
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4.3.2 Disadvantages  
We mentioned that brands that were performing poorly were those most susceptible to being 
taken over.  However, when deciding on local brands to buy, Chinese firms should focus on 
strong brands that will favourable affect the image of their product offerings.  If you acquire 
a failing brand you have to invest in it and build it up again, in which case you may just as 
well have built your brand up organically.  Given that the acquisition focus should be on 
strong brands, the price that has to be paid for these brands is often shocking; we noted in 
the introduction that the Coca Cola brand alone is valued at more than $65 billion.  This is 
one of the main disadvantages of expansion through acquisition.  You are often over-paying 
for an asset that is hard to inspect, yet easily destroyed.  If the brand’s existing customers 
resented the foreign take over of the firm, or the company has undiscovered detrimental 
baggage, the brand you just paid so dearly for has already depreciated in value. 
 
Research on cross-border acquisitions in Europe has shown that “overall 25% were straight 
failures and 25% not worth doing, giving a success score of 50%”. (Lasserre; 2003, pg 138)  
A large contributing factor to this low success rate is the difficulty involved when trying to 
fuse together two distinct corporations from different countries.  The survey here focused 
only on cross-border acquisitions within Europe, so we can imagine the success rate 
dropping considerably if it were to include Chinese firms.  The before mentioned cultural 
difference, and not at least the linguistic difference, between Chinese firms and those of the 
west will no doubt magnify the conflicts encountered while integrating the two firms.  A 
typical cultural example would be the Chinese firm promoting employees on the basis of 
seniority, whilst western firms would insist to promote employees on the basis of merit. 
 
One could argue that since the Chinese firm is acquiring a majority stake in the western firm 
it has the ability to dictate procedures and actions.  Technically, the Chinese firm may have 
that ability, but strategically it would be disastrous because gradually the employees would 
leave the organisation.  When employees leave a corporation, especially management, they 
take with them their competencies and thereby many of the advantages you initially acquired 
the firm for.  The brand image can very easily be tarnished, not only by media reports of 
 54 
employees leaving the newly acquired firm, but also because the people you hire to replace 
the former employees may not necessarily have the training and experience needed to fully 
understand and maintain the original brand image. 
 
If the existing employees leave the firm you also have to pay for recruitment and training of 
new employees, on top of the possibly inflated purchase price.  However, even if the 
employees in the newly acquired firm don’t leave, there will still be an extra strain on the 
management in the home-country, which now has to establish good communications with 
their new foreign subsidiary.  As we mentioned before, the availability of capable Chinese 
managers is not great and in combination with the significant cultural differences we can 
assume establishing effective communications will be a major challenge. 
 
Lastly, finding suitable targets for acquisition may also be a difficult process.  Albeit one 
pays a substantial price for a company, national institutions or shareholders may prevent the 
acquisition from going ahead.  A domestic firm being taken over by a foreign company may 
bruise national pride and being a Chinese company, in for example the USA, will not reduce 
the extent of this bruising. 
 
4.3.3 Examples  
The most demonstrative example of a Chinese firm establishing a global brand through 
acquisition is that of the I.T. company Lenovo.  Lenovo (know as Legend until 2003) was 
started in 1984 on a Beijing campus by eleven likeminded scientists.  Their initial 
investment only amounted to $24,000 and they acted as a distributor of foreign brands such 
as IBM and Hewlett Packard (www.news.bbc.co.uk).  The company has since grown at an 
astounding rate, for the year ended 31 March 2006 the company turnover was $13,276 
million and employment equalled 21,400 people worldwide (www.pc.ibm.com).  
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In December 2004 Lenovo paid $1.75 billion for IBM’s PC hardware division and the right 
to use the IBM brand for five years.  After the acquisition Lenovo is now the world’s third 
largest computer vendor after Dell and Hewlett Packard (www.news.bbc.co.uk).  The move 
was clearly designed to overcome the weak brand image Lenovo had outside Asian markets.  
Now Lenovo can exploit IBM’s brand image and sell products under their name.   
 
Lenovo realised the danger of employees fleeing their newly acquired company and hence 
assigned IBM’s senior vice president Stephen Ward, as the firm's chief executive.  Another 
aspect of the deal that increases the likelihood of successful integration between the two 
firms is that IBM has 18.9% stake in Lenovo and thus have an incentive for the acquisition 
to go smoothly.  In addition, the Lenovo headquarters have now moved from Beijing to New 
York, which further confirms Lenovo’s intention to become a global brand 
(www.news.bbc.co.uk). 
 
 
4.4 Example pitfalls 
The examples we gave of Chinese firms attempting to develop global brands through 
engaging in either organic or acquisition expansion strategies both seemed rather positive, 
but they are one of the few successful examples and even they are not without troubles.  For 
Haier, establishing a production plant in South Carolina and setting up their US headquarters 
in Manhattan will erode a substantial part of their low-cost advantage.  If it were not for the 
encouragement and help it received from the Chinese government, who is a part owner, this 
move would have been of greater detriment to the firm.  Building a global brand takes time, 
but for being the world's fourth-largest white-goods maker (after Whirlpool, Electrolux and 
Bosch-Siemens; before GE) with substantial market share, its brand still carries relatively 
little weight internationally. (www.economist.com) 
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Lenovo is also a partly state-owned company and also received crucial help to finance their 
acquisition of IBM’s PC hardware division.  We mentioned previously that when acquiring a 
foreign brand one should target strong brands.  While IBM is by no means a weak brand, it 
has been moving its focus away from personal computers to the business-to-business market 
and has thus perhaps not brought Lenovo the profits it hoped.  On the 1st August 2006 
Reuters news agency reported that “Lenovo Group Ltd. is expected to post its second 
straight quarterly loss as the world's third-largest PC maker struggles to turn around the 
loss-making business it bought from IBM.” (Leung; 01/08/2006)  In addition, the previously 
mentioned disadvantage of resistance from national institutions was also evident during this 
acquisition as the U.S. Justice Department, and Department of Homeland Security, both 
voiced concerns about the Lenovo purchase, fearing it could offer opportunities for 
industrial espionage (www.news.bbc.co.uk).  
 
 
4.5 Summary 
At the beginning of this chapter it was argued that the focus for Chinese firms attempting to 
establish global brands should either be on a wholly-owned subsidiary strategy or one of 
acquisition.  We then went on to outline the broad advantages and disadvantages of such 
strategies.  The examples presented showed that Chinese firms do engage in such strategies 
and that they are not without dangers.  In the next chapter we will seek to explain how joint-
ventures, in a branding context, can perhaps be an even more favourable strategic option for 
Chinese firms.  
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5. Alliance expansion strategy 
5.1 Joint ventures 
Using the below make-buy-ally (MBA) matrix (Child and Faulkner; 1998, pg 91) we can 
conclude that allying with another organisation can also be an appropriate course of action 
when attempting to establish a global brand: 
 
 
 
The MBA matrix is meant as an aid to managers when deciding on how best to carry out 
business activities (versus entry modes in the previous chapter).  Should the organisation 
either “Buy” the product from an external organisation (the acquisition alternative), “Make” 
the product in-house (the organic expansion alternative), or “Ally” with a partner to produce 
it together.  Depending on the strategic importance of the activity and the competence a firm 
has regarding this activity, it should choose how to proceed. 
 
In the case of Chinese firms establishing global brands, we argued in the second chapter of 
this paper that this activity was of great strategic importance.  In regards to the competence 
that Chinese firms have in this field, we argued in the third chapter of this paper that this was 
low.  As a result we clearly see that it is the top right-hand box that applies to us, namely 
 58 
“Ally”.  This means that Chinese firms should seek out organisations in western markets that 
have a competence in branding and form a type of Joint-Venture (J-V) with them so they can 
enhance their own brand equity.  J-Vs come in many forms but in essence it is “an 
agreement by two or more companies to produce a product or service together.” 
(Gooderham and Nordhaug; 2003, pg 17)  As stated previously, the focus of this paper is 
predominantly on the branding aspect of Chinese firms.  In the field of branding a J-V is in 
essence a co-branding partnership.      
 
 
5.2 Co-branding 
When Chinese firms enter foreign markets by partnering their brand with a local brand they 
are engaging in a branding alliance, also know as co-branding.  Co-branding is essentially 
when two or more organisations work together to promote their products using both their 
brands in the marketing context.  For a more exact definition please see the introduction of 
this paper where we quoted Simonin (1998).  Branding alliances are a relatively new 
phenomenon and have increased dramatically over the last decade.  Some of the earliest and 
most known examples of co-branding can be found in credit card industry where Visa has 
teamed up with likes of General Motors and AT&T.  Other examples of co-branding include 
McDonalds working with Disney (eg. The Lion King), Diet Coke and NutraSweet, Intel 
(inside) and IBM, Nestle and Nesquik (Cereal Bars). 
 
By using two brands instead of one, the companies basically hope to reach a larger customer 
base and convey a stronger reassurance of quality.  This might help them sell more units of 
the co-branded product but how does this affect the individual partner brands (referred to as 
parent brands) when they are selling their own products and thus how can it aid Chinese 
brands in overcoming their branding disadvantage?  Simonin and Ruth (1998; pg 31) 
constructed a conceptual model of how this occurs and what factors play a role in 
determining the eventual effects on the parent brands: 
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We can see that they highlight four main factors that contribute positively towards the 
perception of the brand alliance.  It comes as no surprise that attitudes towards the parent 
brands prior to the alliance will have an impact on the attitudes towards the eventual 
alliance.  The more positive the pre-attitudes are the more favourable the attitudes toward the 
brand alliance will be (H3a & H3b).  Product fit implies the extent to which the product 
categories of the parent brands are related or match.  If the level of fit is high, it will have a 
positive effect on the attitude towards the brand alliance (H4).  Brand fit relates to the level 
of cohesiveness between the parent brands and how well they suit each other.  The better the 
fit, the more favourable the evaluation of the brand alliance will be (H5).        
 
Simonin and Ruth (1998) found that the spillover effect, which is what affects the 
consumers’ attitude towards the parent brands, stem from the perception of the branding 
alliance.  The more positive the perception of the branding alliance, the more favourable the 
affect upon the parent brands will be (H1a & H1b).  Simonin and Ruth (1998, pg 36) claim 
this affect (H1a & H1b) is not negligible as they state “brand alliances do measurably affect 
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perceptions of partner brands, a relationship of significant theoretical and practical 
importance…”.   
 
Another discovery made by Simonin and Ruth (1998) that is of relevance to Chinese firms 
wanting to establish global brands is that the spillover effects from a branding alliance do 
not necessarily affect the partners equally.  What they found was that the less familiar brand 
in the alliance will experience stronger spillover effects.  This appears logical as consumers 
have, prior to the alliance, not yet had a chance to developed strong associations towards the 
lesser known brand.  This can be seen as a great opportunity for Chinese firms, as they are 
typically the lesser known brand and can therefore experience greater brand image 
improvement through the spillover effects, given that the consumer views the alliance as 
favourable.  However, it can also be seen as a possible danger because if the alliance is 
viewed as unfavourable by the consumer, the detrimental effects of the spillover are also 
greater. 
 
 
5.3 Alliance benefits 
5.3.1 Joint venture advantages 
Forming a J-V has certain general advantages.  Similar to the acquisition route, forming a J-
V gives a firm access to the competencies and expertise of a local company, which can help 
it adapt to some of the subtle differences of the local market.  The foreign firm does not have 
to recruit and train a large number of new employees because it can to some extent utilize 
the staff of the local company.  We also mentioned that sometimes in an acquisition, 
management leave the company that was acquired and thus take with them the firms 
competencies and expertise.  In the case of J-Vs we could argue that the likelihood for 
employees to leave the collaboration is less because they have a guaranteed say in its 
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activities and a share in its outcome.  In addition, the action of forming a partnership 
indicates some level of willingness to make the alliance beneficial. 
 
Compared to the organic and acquisition routes, the J-V option is a less costly and thus risky 
entry strategy.  You do not have to build up a market presence from scratch and you do not 
have to buy a possibly over-priced local brand.  This is important since the majority of 
Chinese firms have a low-cost strategy and should not erode this competitive advantage.  
Working in a J-V you can pay for the expertise and knowledge you receive by offering your 
partner knowledge and expertise concerning your core competence.  In the case of Chinese 
firms, they can perhaps offer information and advice on doing business in the world’s largest 
consumer market in exchange for branding expertise in western markets.  
 
The speed, at which the foreign firm can establish a brand presence in the local market with 
a J-V, is potentially very fast.  Given access to the partner’s customer base, the foreign firm 
can easily get in direct contact with potential customers.  Moreover, using the existing 
distribution networks of ones partner can significantly increase the rate at which the foreign 
firm gets it products in stores and its brand visible.  The J-V route is faster than the organic 
route, but the fastest way to gain a brand presence in a foreign market is naturally through 
the acquisition route.      
 
Another advantage of J-Vs that is worthy of mentioning is that it very often avoids 
troublesome protectionist legislation.  Also, the acquisition of a domestic company may stir 
up scepticism and unleash a wave of “economic patriotism”, followed by negative media 
coverage and thus poor consumer attitudes towards the foreign brand.  However, engaging in 
a partnership with a local company will doubtfully incite such a response.  Furthermore, the 
previously mentioned detrimental effects of the Chinese country image may be reduced 
since a partnership with a local firm weakens the link of a product to its foreign counterpart. 
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5.3.2 Co-branding advantages 
Additional advantages of J-Vs that are specific to co-branding can be witnessed in research 
carried out by Washburn et al (2000).  Washburn investigated the consequences of co-
branding between brands of different equity.  Brand equity is in a sense the strength of a 
brand, and since recognition and awareness (i.e. salience) are vital parts of becoming a 
strong brand, we can argue that Chinese brands are typically of low equity in the 
international setting.  The research focused on four types of co-brands: 
1. A high equity brand pairing with another high equity brand 
2. A low equity brand pairing with a low equity brand 
3. A high equity brand pairing with a low equity brand 
4. A low equity (LE) brand pairing with a high equity (HE) brand 
 
The first type of co-brand is of little interest to us as it is not applicable to Chinese (LE) 
brands, but the findings from the other three types of co-brands are of significance.  They 
found that when a HE brand was paired with a LE brand and product trials were positive that 
brand equity of the LE brand increased significantly whilst the brand equity of the HE 
remained the same.  Similarly, when a LE brand was paired with a HE brand and product 
trials were positive, the brand equity of the LE brand increased significantly whilst the brand 
equity of the HE brand remained stable.  Even though the brand equity of the LE brands in 
the two types of co-brands (type 2 & 3) both increased, it was when the LE brand took the 
dominant position in the partnership that it benefited the most (type 2).  The research also 
found that when a LE brand paired with a LE brand, the brand equity of the two constituent 
brands both increased after a positive product trial, albeit not very much. 
 
The research thus suggests that for Chinese firms, pairing with a HE brand from a 
compatible product category will result in significant positive spillovers; given the product 
trials are positive.  Being the dominant partner gives the Chinese brand a greater brand 
equity increase, but either way the Chinese brand gains.  Furthermore, even if Chinese 
brands pair with other LE brands and the product trials are positive, there will be some 
favourable spillover effects for both parties.  The main positive outcome for Chinese brands 
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was that none of the HE brands were negatively affected when paired with LE brands.  This 
means that when Chinese brands attempt to find HE partners to pair with they can point to 
research that assures their potential partners they will not suffer from the partnership, given 
positive product trials.   
 
Perception of poor quality is one of the main challenges that Chinese brands have to endure 
in foreign markets, as well as the domestic market.  The negative quality association means 
that potential customers are reluctant to try the Chinese products, but when co-branded with 
a firm that has favourable quality associations, consumers would be more willing to take the 
chance.  Rao, Akshay R. et al (1999) state that consumers are more willing to take this 
chance because the Chinese brand is in essence buying “vulnerability” from the more 
established brand.  The new (Chinese) brand may just be a short-term venture intending to 
trick consumers into buying their product before they close operations and shift to a new 
brand name, whereas if the established brand delivers lower than claimed quality it will 
result in intolerable economic losses.      
 
A branding alliance gives Chinese brands the opportunity not only to convince potential 
customers to try their brand (albeit co-branded), but also to increase the equity of their brand 
through positive spillovers.  This gives Chinese brands a foot in the door and the chance to 
eventually sell many of their own branded products in the foreign market.  There are many 
additional advantages of engaging in a branding alliance, Blackett & Boad (1999, Ch.2) list 
23 specific opportunities and benefits in their book.  However, in the case of Chinese brands 
entering developed markets, the broad advantages of J-Vs mentioned in section 5.3.1 and the 
advantages discussed in this section, are most relevant ones.   
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5.4 Alliance drawbacks 
5.4.1 Joint venture disadvantages 
A J-V seems to overcome many of the drawbacks of the organic or acquisition route, but 
obviously they are not without potential pitfalls.  Firstly there is a lack of total control in 
partnership.  If one buys or builds a brand one has the authority to quickly take difficult 
decisions, but if one is in a partnership, one must try to solve issues of conflict through 
consensus.  This can be a very long and strenuous process since the goals of the partnering 
brands are never identical.  One of the first tasks that are often mentioned as a potential 
conflict source is nominating one single boss for the alliance. 
 
Given that the pre-partnership negotiations and boss appointing go smoothly, there is no way 
to assure that the local firm shares the intangible knowledge nested inside their employees.  
Even if the local firm is flexible and willing to share this knowledge, that is still no 
guarantee.  Knowledge transfer is a complicated process and its complexity is exacerbated 
by the differences in national and corporate culture that typical exists between Chinese and 
western firms.     
 
We previously discussed the shortage of talented managers in China and the difficulty this 
posed for the other two types of brand establishing routes.  Although perhaps not as 
significant, the need for culturally sensitive and competent managers is also an issue in 
branding alliances.  Finding these types of capable managers may be a challenge for the 
Chinese firm and create a strain on their resources.  In addition, the employees from the 
western firm might also not have a high level of cultural understanding.  
 
5.4.2 Co-branding disadvantages 
A potential disadvantage of J-Vs that is specific to co-branding is the concept of brand 
dilution.  Nunes et al (2003, pg 22) describes brand dilution as when the brand loses its 
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meaning to customers.  If a brand forms alliances with a large number of other brands it risks 
confusing the customer and thus upsetting them and causing them to opt for another brand 
which they feel they understand better. (The exception here is VISA which has joined with 
countless other brands yet still has a strong brand)  This negative effect is more applicable to 
well established brands with many branding alliances, thus may not be such a significant risk 
to Chinese brands.    
 
Another risk of co-branding is the possibility of the devaluation of your partner’s brand and 
thereby the devaluation of your own brand.  If the company, which you are engaged in a 
branding alliance with, acts in a grossly unethical manner and it becomes known to the 
public, the negative press will result in unfavourable associations towards the partner brand.  
This will directly affect the co-branded product and thus result in detrimental spillover 
effects for both parent brands.  As we have mentioned earlier in this chapter, the spillover 
effects are great for the Chinese brands. (i.e. low-equity brands)       
 
Although it is a challenge that is generic for all J-Vs, finding a suitable and willing partner 
for a co-branding partnership is even more difficult and crucial for the success of an alliance.  
According to Simonin and Ruth (1999) a good partner brand should evoke positive 
associations (attitudes) from the consumer, fit well with your product group, and mesh well 
with your brand image.  These requirements significantly limit the amount of potential 
partners that Chinese firms should choose from. 
 
 
5.5 Summary 
At the start of this chapter we used established theories to argue that forming a J-V was a 
suitable strategy for Chinese firms to adopt when developing a global brand.  We then 
proceeded to distinguish co-branding as a certain form of J-V and explained how a branding 
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alliance can affect the original partner brands through spillovers.  In addition, we argued that 
Chinese brands would be more susceptible to spillover effects.  Then the generic advantages 
of J-Vs and more specific advantages of co-branding were discussed, followed by their 
disadvantages.   
 
In the next chapter an attempt will be made to summarise the main aspects of this project and 
formulate general recommendations applicable to Chinese firms wishing to establish global 
brands.  Lastly, we will discuss some of the limitations of this research. 
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6.   Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and contributions 
In regards to Chinese consumer markets, most of the existing research centres on how 
western firms can and should enter these rapidly growing markets.  In comparison, there is 
rather limited coverage of how Chinese firms can and should enter western markets.  This 
paper sheds some light on why and how Chinese firms should seek to enter foreign markets.  
 
The second chapter presented some strong arguments for why Chinese firms should change 
their focus from being low-cost OEM’s (Original Equipment Manufacturers) to 
concentrating on promoting their own brand.  The OEM focus has been profitable in the past 
as China has capitalised on its low-cost labour, but as the market gets more crowded input 
prices will eventually rise and thus diminish this competitive advantage.  Furthermore, if 
China eventually gives in to US pressure to raise the value of the Yuan (eg. the suggested 
40%), it will mean a drastic reduction in China’s low-cost advantage.  We are already 
witnessing some businesses moving production to Vietnam and Bangladesh in order to cut 
costs, thereby proving this focus is not sustainable in the long-run.   
 
In addition to the OEM focus not being sustainable in the long-run, five arguments for 
establishing a global presence were listed and applied to Chinese firms.  The knowledge 
imperative and globalization of competitors were mentioned as the most pressing arguments.  
The rise in global competitors was further highlighted using research showing an increased 
presence of foreign brands in the mind of Chinese consumers.  As a result, the main 
argument for Chinese firms to go global was not so much to gain a competitive advantage, 
but rather to eliminate a competitive disadvantage in relation to western brands already 
present in Chinese markets.   
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The associated prestige and perceived quality of being a “global” brand was also 
documented, adding to the incentive for Chinese firms to go global.  Attention was also 
drawn to the high ratings Chinese consumers (especially the younger generation) gave 
foreign produced goods versus the low ratings they gave domestically produced products.  
This implies that if Chinese brands go global they should emphasize this when marketing 
goods in their home market, thereby attempting to distance themselves from the poor quality 
associated with domestic producers.  Lastly, the second chapter concluded by outlining some 
of the initiatives put in place by the Chinese government in order to encourage the 
establishment of global Chinese brands.  This serves an additional confirmation of the 
importance, and adds another incentive, for Chinese firms to develop strong global brands.  
 
In chapter 3 attempts were made to explain why China had not yet developed globally 
known brands and what obstacles lay in the way for Chinese firms wanting to establish such 
brands in the future.  Historical factors were mentioned as one of the main reasons why the 
notion of branding was discovered so late in China.  Given this late start Chinese 
entrepreneurs have a lot to learn from their western counterparts and have to try and progress 
faster along the branding learning curve. 
 
The Chinese economy has in the past couple decades demonstrated astounding growth and 
taken substantial steps towards opening up to the world’s markets.  However, obstacles to 
free-competition are still present and these indirectly reduce the incentive to build brands.  In 
a free-market economy the majority of Chinese SOEs would have been closed down long 
ago and replaced by more entrepreneurial companies who would be much more inclined to 
utilise (albeit more risky) strategies that could lead to a sustainable competitive advantage, 
i.e. building a strong brand.   
 
The rise in urbanisation and improvement in infrastructure over the past years has meant that 
Chinese consumers are now much more susceptive to branding campaigns.  Therefore 
Chinese firms should regularly re-evaluate the potential reach (profitability) of domestic 
branding campaigns.  Furthermore, in western markets infrastructure tends to be more 
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developed and better suited for marketing campaigns, hence Chinese firms should keep this 
in mind when calculating possible payoffs.        
 
The high level of provincial independence and embedded rivalry amongst these provinces is 
also used to explain why China has not until lately raised any strong national brands.  
Instead, China has produced many regional brands that are not as well equipped to develop 
into global brands as perhaps a strong national brand would have been.  Every nation will 
have some element of regional rivalry, which Chinese firms will be well equipped to handle, 
but an over emphasis on these rivalries may be detrimental in well developed economies. 
 
Lack of consumer research in the past has meant that Chinese firms are not very familiar 
with their customer groups.  In the past Chinese consumers simply had to purchase what 
firms produced and there was no need for firms to listen to their customers.  However, in the 
competitive markets of today, Chinese firms must not only listen to what their customers 
want but even try to predict what they may want in the future.  For this to be possible, 
detailed descriptions of the firm’s customer segments and how they have changed over time 
are vital.  This puts Chinese firms at a disadvantage since their consumer research industry is 
still in its early stages.  Furthermore, with the rapidly changing consumer markets and 
diversity of customers in China, developing a detailed national branding strategy with a 
narrow customer focus is near impossible.  Given the particular infrastructure and culture in 
China, firms will need to develop their own method for collecting and interpreting consumer 
research.  
 
Using theory regarding culture comparison, it was argued that China faced an additional 
challenge when attempting to establish brands in western markets.  The bar charts that were 
presented showed that the average Chinese consumer was very different from his/her 
western counterpart in three out of the five dimensions.  This implies that Chinese firms will 
have a hard time trying to interpret or predict the behaviour of their western customers, and 
should therefore take into account the culture dimension rankings when undergoing such 
interpretation.  Furthermore, branding strategies that were successful in western markets 
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may not bring the same benefits in Chinese markets.  Although Chinese firms have to catch 
up to the advanced stages of branding in the west, they should not be too eager and accept 
everything because it may not be applicable in their culture.   
 
The lack of IPRs in China is a further disincentive to establishing strong brands.  It makes it 
possible for counterfeiters to benefit from the resources other companies have invested into 
building a brand, whilst damaging the reputation of the original brands.  In western markets 
IPRs are enforced more strictly and hence Chinese firms need not be as reluctant to invest in 
their brand image there. 
 
Lastly the chapter concludes by citing country image as a severe obstacle for developing 
global Chinese brands.  Given the rather weak track record for global Chinese brands, 
consumers in western markets have little knowledge of Chinese products and therefore use 
the country’s unfavourable country image as a main factor when assessing a new products 
quality.  Chinese firms must be aware of this disadvantage and attempt to limit it.  The best 
way to do that is to export a stream of quality products over time and thereby gradually alter 
the summary construct of the western consumers’ Chinese country image.  
 
In chapter 4 it was argued that the only viable strategy for entering foreign markets and 
establishing a brand presence was either the organic route or the acquisition route.  The 
advantages of the organic route were mainly full control and starting with a clean slate, 
whilst the disadvantages were basically the financial resources demanded and time required.  
As an example, the Haier Group and its activities were elaborated upon.  The advantages of 
the acquisition route were amongst others, the speed at which a brand presence could be 
established and the direct link to existing customers.  Its disadvantages included paying 
inflated prices for vulnerable brands and the possibility of conflict between the two firms.  
Lenevo was the Chinese firm used to demonstrate the acquisition route.   
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Chapter 5 suggested a middle alternative to the two strategies discussed in chapter 4, namely 
co-branding.  It was explained that by marketing a co-branded product it would not only be 
easier to get consumers to try a unknown Chinese brand, but that positive experiences could 
result in spillover effects that would be favourable to the Chinese parent brand.  
Furthermore, research was discussed that showed Chinese brands would be more susceptible 
to these spillover effects since they were typically the least known of the partnering brands.  
The more generic advantages of forming a J-V, compared to organic or acquisition growth, 
were also discussed.   
 
The main disadvantages of forming a J-V were said to be the lack of full control, thus the 
need for consensus, and the fact that there is no guarantee that firms will be able to transfer 
knowledge to each other.  The more specific co-branding disadvantages that were mentioned 
were brand dilution and brand devaluation.  However, the main challenge of forming a 
successful branding alliance is finding the right partner.   Not only does the company in 
question have to have a strong brand name that fits with the brand and product group of the 
partner, but also the firms has to be willing to partner with a lesser known Chinese brand.  
 
 
6.2 Recommendation 
Chinese firms who currently enjoy the benefits of a low-cost base and focus on producing 
un-branded goods for foreign firms to sell under their own brand, should realise that their 
competitive advantage will not last much longer.  They should capitalise on their current 
low-cost advantage and use it to help transform themselves to globally recognized brands.  
The manufacturing process and production techniques that the Chinese firms have learnt 
whilst producing for foreign brands can be of some use when the foreign brands eventually 
pull-out, but without a competitively low cost base or a strong brand, theses skills are little 
use.  
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Regardless of the difficulty that finding a suitable partner poses, engaging in a branding 
alliance generally seems to be the most attractive strategy for Chinese firms establishing a 
brand presence in a foreign market.  The co-branding method falls in between the two 
extremes of the alternative strategies, thereby seemingly reaping most of their benefits yet 
avoiding their drawbacks.   
 
Firstly, the potential costs of this strategy are much lower than both the organic or 
acquisition route.  Naturally the Chinese firms still has to set up core functions in the foreign 
country, but costs for such things as marketing and distribution can be significantly reduced.  
Secondly, the Chinese firm is not forced to invest large amounts of money like with the other 
two strategies, yet it still establishes a quick presence in the foreign market.  Keeping costs 
down is a vital competitive advantage for a majority of Chinese firms and engaging in an 
expensive entry strategy, like we saw with the Lenovo and Haier examples in chapter 4, can 
seriously damage a firms profitability.   
 
Thirdly, co-branding is a form of partnership, which none of the other two strategies are.  
This signals a will to work together and this is dearly needed if the Chinese firm is to learn 
about a complex and intangible concept like branding.  Fourthly, when a well established 
western brand is willing to partner up with a Chinese brand it signals an instant guarantee 
(vulnerability) to the western consumer.  This guarantee reduces one of the largest barriers 
Chinese firms face when attempting to establish their brands in the west, the negative quality 
associations that consumers have of products with Chinese origin.  When undertaking the 
organic strategy there is no such guarantee, and when undertaking the acquisition strategy 
there is a risk of economic patriotism.   
 
In addition, the main disadvantage of the co-branding strategy is not only finding a suitable 
partner, but finding a suitable partner that is willing to partner with an unknown Chinese 
brand.  However, the lack of will by western brands to pair with Chinese brands is a 
disadvantage that may slowly become less of a problem.  As the Chinese economy grows 
and consumer markets become more lucrative, foreign brands will become more determined 
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to be major players in these markets.  This implies that the local knowledge and networks, 
which domestic firms have developed, will make them a more attractive partner to western 
firms. 
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